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AALS Hot Topic Panel Question & Answer Session
PROFESSOR JOONDEPH: We would now like to open this discussion for questions, and I will be repeating them for purposes of the
podcast.
I have a question on economic activity.
AUDIENCE QUESTION:
was
implicitly relying on a transaction test
Erwin suggested that Randy
for activity and that something was economic activity only if it involved
an economic transaction. So I'd like to ask Randy whether or not that is,
in fact, an implicit premise of his argument. The second question relates
to the idea that framing is important. The question is whether or not
the approach that any framing for which Congress could have a rational
basis is consistent with the outcomes in Lopez and Morrison, given that
Congress could rationally have seen Lopez as about the economics of
education at large, and given that in Morrison they could have seen the
statute as framed in relationship to the economics of women's role in the
economy and their ability to use transportation and travel freely.
PROFESSORJOONDEPH: The first question, to Randy in particular,
is whether, under his view of "economic activity," that category only
includes activities involving an economic transaction. And the second
question is to everyone: whether the rational basis test really applies
across the board in light of Lopez and Morrison.
PROFESSOR BARNETT: No, transaction is not a word that enters
into the doctrine at all; activity is the word that's used time and time
again in every single case involving this sort of thing. In the case of
Raich, Angel was certainly engaged in activity when she possessed
medical marijuana and when she used it and when it was grown for her.
It is not all that difficult a distinction to make. In fact, we make it all
the time. I realize that, as law professors, we're used to questioning the
act-omission distinction, the difference between doing something and not
doing something. It's something we're accustomed to doing in class, but
in the real world, we make this distinction all the time. It's really
essential to moral responsibility. We're responsible for what we do;
we're not responsible for what we don't do unless we have a pre-existing
duty that we must do something.
So, that is a pretty fundamental distinction. It's the difference
between telling Angel that she cannot engage in an activity-the activity
of cultivating cannabis for her own use-and telling her that she must
grow cannabis for her own use. I think you have to go to law school to
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not understand this distinction. Even the Supreme Court should get
this one.
That's the first thing I would say, and then I would use that as a
springboard to something that Gillian said about the military draft. She
said, "Well, of course we've mandated activity before-we can draft you."
Well, stop and think about the implications of that argument. Because
Congress has the power to draft you to defend the country, they have the
power to make you do anything else that they wish you to do as long as
there is a rational basis for thinking it's related to the regulation of the
national economy? Seriously? Do you believe that?
Drafting you into the Army is really the functional equivalent of
enslaving you, and there is a prohibition against that in the Constitution. So what was the way around that? When this was litigated, what
did the Supreme Court say was the reason why the Thirteenth
Amendment did not apply to the draft? The answer the Court gave was
that there is a fundamental duty of citizenship to defend the country in
return for the benefits and protections the country affords you. It's a
fundamental duty of citizenship. So, it's an exceptional power that they
have. There are very few such duties that American citizens owe to the
government. Part of what defines us as American citizens is the fact
that we have a limited number of duties to the government that are
essential to our citizenship.
If this principle is recognized and accepted as law, it will mean that
as a citizen you owe a duty to Congress to do anything that Congress
has a rational basis for thinking is necessary for the regulation of the
national economy. And that is a very sweeping claim of power indeed.
That's one of the reasons why it's never been done before.
And I just want to make one further clarification. Erwin offered a
very nice summary of the arguments that would be argued in the
Supreme Court opinion, but there is one little mistake in what he said.
You can decide for yourself who is right about this, but I don't believe
that, under the Raich test, Congress can do something if it rationally
believes that it is regulating economic activity. I think Raich says that
Congress can do something if it has a rational basis for regulating
economic activity. It is still a judicial matter as to whether something
is economic activity or not. The Court will not defer to Congress to
determine whether it's economic activity, only whether there is a basis
for regulating it if it is an economic activity. It's a small disagreement,
but I think some of Erwin's argument turns on it.
PROFESSOR METZGER: On your second question, whether or not
one of the things we are seeing in Lopez to Morrison to Raich is an
emergence of how we are going to do the economic activity analysis, and
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whether we could go back to Lopez and see that as having actual
economic activity there. That is a question people have argued and
debated. The more important point is that the Court has made clear
that economic activity remains an overall limit, so the scope of the
regulation and the nature of the activity matter. And as Randy
mentioned, the Court is going to do an independent assessment of
whether the nature of that activity is economic or not. So, going back to
your point about Lopez versus this case, I do not think that there is any
doubt that the overall context here is one of economic activity, whereas
in Lopez the Court rejected the idea of an educational effect as being
enough to create economic activity. The other thing that was different
about Lopez is that you did not have this very broad regulation and
activity as a whole. As Professor Oedel alluded to in his remarks, the
provision is just one part of an incredibly elaborate bill, and I think that
matters for how the Court copes with the question of the level at which
you judge the scope of congressional regulation. Those are obvious
distinctions between the two cases.
Professor Barnett, on your point about the draft and that there is no
limit to what the government can require you to do if they can require
this: it cannot be that only law professors could ignore the act-omission
distinction, and I think that only law professors could come up with
some of the absurd hypotheticals that have come up in this area about
things Congress might do as showing the need for this kind of limit
because otherwise all hell will break loose. I resist these hypotheticals
for a variety of reasons, one of which is that Congress is not doing some
of the extreme measures that have been articulated-like requiring
individuals to buy GM cars and eat our vegetables and so forth. And it
is not doing that for a very important reason that has nothing to do with
activity and inactivity. Congress could mandate that, if you are going
to buy a car-that is, engage in activity-you must buy a GM car.
Congress is not imposing that requirement in large part because of
political constraints, and we should not ignore those because they are
quite potent. In addition, there are individual liberty constraints that
have been recognized under the Constitution-protections against
intrusions into bodily control and individual liberty. So, there are
absolutely limits on Congress here that matter.
The key point is that the activity/inactivity limit really does not work.
It is not much of a limit at all. I also do not think that it is one that the
Court is going to go off on. Most likely, the Court is going to take the
broader framing and see this as actually a part of regulation of economic
activity-even though I think that if the Court reached the question, it
would say that Congress could regulate inactivity.
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DEAN CHEMERINSKY: Let me try to address both parts of the
question. In response to the first, once it is conceived that economic
activity does not require a transaction, then the broad definition of
economic activity shows that this clearly fits within the scope of
Congress's Commerce Clause power. Once you raise the status that
growing marijuana for home consumption is regarded as an economic
activity, then surely the economic transaction of purchasing, or the
economic decision not to purchase, health care insurance fits within
economic activity.
Imagine that it costs $100 a month to either buy health care or pay
the penalty. The choice of whether to spend that $100 for health care
is an economic choice, which fits within the broad definition of economic
activity. Or another way to think of it is to imagine if Congress had
decided to have a national health care plan-a single-payer plan-and
raised everyone's taxes by an amount necessary to pay for that. Is there
anyone who would doubt that Congress would have the authority to do
that? Well, Congress has essentially done exactly the same thing here
by requiring everyone to purchase health care or pay an amount of
money that can easily be seen as a tax, so as to subsidize it.
It is here that Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass'n175 becomes
important. That is the case where Congress said that everybody who
produces cattle has to pay a $1.00 per head fee, and this was challenged
as unconstitutional. The Supreme Court said Congress could impose a
tax just on cattle, and if Congress wants to then spend that money for
advertising for beef consumptions, it is permissible. This seems to
parallel the health care legislation.
Now, the second part of the question. Professor Barnett and I have a
slight disagreement over how Justice Stephens is using the rational
basis test under the third prong of the Raich test. I think what the
Court is saying here is, so long as Congress has a reason to believe, a
rational basis to believe, this economic activity has a substantial effect
on interstate commerce, then Congress can regulate it. I think what
Lopez and Morrison stand for is the proposition that those situations
were too attenuated for economic activity to fit even within the rational
basis test. A gun near a school seems too far away from economic
activity. Sexual assault is too far away from economic activity. But
this, as I said, is a trillion-dollar industry.
Now, keep in mind, Lopez and Morrison are 5-4 decisions, Gonzalez v.
Raich is a 6-3 decision, and what we have in Gonzalez v. Raich is that
some of the dissenters from Lopez and Morrison now are in the majority,

175.

544 U.S. 550 (2005).
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so it is not surprising that Gonzalez v. Raich has the rational basis
language that Morrison and Lopez do not. But it is a language that
precedes Raich; it goes back to much earlier cases, and I think the Court
would say Congress can certainly reasonably believe this is within the
scope of Congress's authority.
PROFESSOR OEDEL: Far be it for me to take issue with one of our
leading constitutional case scholars. I use Erwin's book in my constitutional law class. However, I do want to take issue with a couple of
things that I think are factually problematic in Erwin's citations. I
think these factual details are meaningful for our present purposes.
Erwin said that Roscoe Filburn was just growing wheat on his farm
and that it was just an activity that is almost like inactivity, economically speaking. Actually, if you look at the factual record in the case of
Wickard v. Filburn,"' Roscoe Filburn was taking subsidies from the
agricultural price support program. He was looking to get handouts
from the federal government and then also wanted to go over the
allotment to raise wheat above the agricultural limit that he was
supposed to reach. Erwin also said that after Title II of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 was passed, people who were engaged in providing public
facilities were required to serve all people. Well, that's true, but that's
only true for people who are engaged in that activity. As a factual
historical matter, the guy who lost the case of Heart of Atlanta
Motel,'7 7 guess what he did after that case? He shut the Heart of
Atlanta Motel down. He, a reprehensible fellow no doubt, chose to be
outside of that activity, but he was not required to go ahead. I think
there's a mischaracterization going on of the actual cases that we're
looking at.
PROFESSOR JOONDEPH: And the next question?
AUDIENCE QUESTION: I'm interested in what role, if any, the word
"regulate" in the Commerce Clause plays, either as a limit on federal
power or as a justification for federal power. Everybody uses the word
here in passing, but there hasn't been any focused attention on what role
the meaning of the word has in the larger question you're debating.
PROFESSOR JOONDEPH: So the precise question concerns the
import of the word "regulate" in Article I, section 8, clause 3.

176. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
177. Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
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PROFESSOR BARNETT: As a matter of doctrine, it has very limited
implications. The reason is that, even though the original core meaning
of the word "regulate" was to make regular or to subject to a rule, it has
also been, from the very beginning, thought to include a power of
prohibition as well as regulation. In fact, Madison used the phrase
"prohibitory regulation." It shows that the word "regulate" basically
does include prohibition because you have to add prohibitory regulation
to it. But, nevertheless, that's part of it.
Second, almost nobody thinks, with respect to the mandate, that
Congress is directly exercising its power to regulate commerce among
several states, which is what it is doing under Southeastern Underwriters178 when it is regulating the insurance company by telling it how it
should go about doing its business. Here, Congress is purporting to
reach activity that is not commerce among several states, but which it
claims it may reach because it is "necessary" to regulating commerce,
even if this may not itself fit the definition of "regulation." I just don't
think that, under the current doctrine, the meaning of "regulate" has
much bite.
PROFESSOR JOONDEPH: Next question?
AUDIENCE QUESTION: We all use the roads and the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, but would Congress have the power to
require us each to spend 100 hours a year working on the roads under
the commerce power? This is somewhat in relation to Randy's distinction of this mandate from the draft.
PROFESSOR JOONDEPH: The question goes to extending the logic
of this argument and whether Congress could force all Americans to
work on the nation's roads.
PROFESSOR METZGER: My short answer to that is going to be, to
the extent there is any limit on Congress's ability to do that, it clearly
is not about activity, because, as you said, we all use the roads.
AUDIENCE QUESTION: It would not be economic activity?
PROFESSOR METZGER: Right. I assumed you were focusing on
forcing individuals to work on the roads. It is connected in that way to
activity, so that is not what is doing the limiting. There are plenty of

178. United States v. Southeastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
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things that we could call upon to prevent that. A big one is political
checks. I think there are actually very potent political checks against
that being required, one coming in the form of unions of highway
workers, so I am really not too worried about that one. But, you know,
we have the political checks. We also have individual liberty protections.
Those kinds of questions really show the point that Professor Chemerinsky made about understanding the liberties that are actually at stake,
and maybe we should focus our attention on those issues rather than on
these questions of congressional power.
DEAN CHEMERINSKY: I am going to echo Professor Metzger. I do
think, as we always teach our students, that there are two separate
questions here. One is whether this is within the scope of Congress's
power, and second, does it violate some constraint, some liberty interest?
I think what is really animating your question is the latter. The sense
is that we should have a liberty interest in not being forced to work on
the roads. As a matter of congressional power, I think this is an easy
question without ever getting into the Commerce Clause. If you look at
the law that created the interstate highway system, it was actually done
by Congress as part of national defense. The title of the Highway Act
includes national defense. If Congress wanted to say that, in order to
get the highways ready for national defense, we need to have work on
the infrastructure done, and it is the Necessary and Proper Clause that
provides a way of doing that, or Congress's ability specifically under a
different clause of Article I section 8 to provide for roads and post offices,
I think Congress under the Necessary and Proper Clause could do so.
Now, I am, like Professor Metzger, not troubled by that hypothethetical because the political realities would keep it from coming about, but
it does animate the question, like it animates so much of the objection
to the federal health care law as a liberty interest that I do not think
would work as a successful basis for challenge either.
PROFESSOR BARNETT: I want to say a little bit about the political
constraints in the context of the tax power theory. There is a lot to be
said about it, and more than I can say now, but it is generally true that
the principal constitutional constraint on the exercise of the tax power
is political. But for the political constraints to kick in, there must be a
clear exertion of the tax power that would then draw political attention
to the fact that it's being exercised, and that would provide the political
constraint. This is not simply putting a burden on Congress to somehow
have a clear statement generally. Rather, if you are going to rely on a
political constraint, you've got to have the assertion of the power. In this
law, none of the rationales that were given for this power were tax-
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power related. They were all regulatory. They all dealt with the
Commerce Clause.
Other provisions of the bill, as Gillian noted, are called excise taxes;
this wasn't one of them. And in a very important part of the bill-which
was very important to Congress because it had to do with how you
scored the bill for purposes of the CPO so you could get its costs under
a trillion dollars-there is a listing of all the revenue provisions of the
bill. But the money that would be gained by the penalty is not listed
among the remedy-raising provisions of the bill. There is a substantive
definition, and a modern one, by Justice Souter that distinguishes
between a "penalty" and a "tax." This particular measure fits Justice
Souter's definition of a "penalty," which is a sanction imposed for the
failure to perform a duty that exists, or a legal duty, which is what this
really was. So, the "penalty" enforcing the mandate is not a tax, based
on the substantive definition of a tax, and the fact that it wasn't clearly
identified as a tax, together with why it was not clearly identified as a
tax: precisely to avoid political accountability for having exerted the tax
power because doing so would have violated the President's pledge not
to raise taxes on persons making below $200,000. The President had
some interest in not violating that pledge, as did the other senators who
drafted this bill. As you know, on television the President denied this
was a tax in response to George Stephanopoulos's challenge that he had
violated his pledge, to which he replied, "No, I haven't. It's not a tax."
So, if the principal constraint on the tax power is political, then it does
make a difference whether this is called a "penalty" or a "tax."
Finally, in every one of the New Deal cases and the post-New Deal
cases that upheld the use of the tax for regulatory purposes, Congress
was expressly asserting its tax power. In these cases, the Court stated
that it would not look behind an expressed assertion of the tax power to
see whether Congress had a regulatory purpose beyond its powers to
regulate. By the same token, the Court will not look behind an
assertion of a Commerce Clause power to state that the measure could
have been recast as a tax precisely because doing it this way evades the
political constraint on the tax power, which is the only constraint that
exists.
PROFESSOR JOONDEPH: Next question?
AUDIENCE QUESTION: First, if a so-called tax is set at such a high
rate that it passes the optimal revenue rates, so it's actually revenuedepleting in its terms, would that still count as a tax? It can have a
regulatory purpose, but if the amount that you pay is above the optimum
revenue rate, wouldn't that just be a clear regulation? Second, if this is
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a tax, is it a "direct" or "indirect" tax? It doesn't look like the normal
excise tax. It's not clear what transaction is being taxed. And if it's a
direct tax, is it apportioned? Obviously, the answer to that is no.
PROFESSOR JOONDEPH: The first question, if I've understood it
correctly, is whether a tax rate that everyone admits is higher than
necessary, and indeed so high that it reduces the revenue generated by
the exaction, is really a regulation and not a tax. The second question
is whether such a tax, if it is a tax, is a "direct tax," and therefore
subject to the apportionment requirements set out in Article I.
PROFESSOR METZGER: Your first point relates to the idea of
whether a punitive rate, among other things, can show a tax to be
regulatory. And you are right, that does matter. When you look at the
case law on the tax power, what has emerged as, perhaps, the most
instructive case in terms of whether or not we look behind a measure's
being called a tax is the Kurth Ranch' case. Kurth Ranch involved
a state measure that was called a tax, and the question was whether or
not it was really a criminal penalty sufficient to trigger double jeopardy.
And the punitive amount of the penalty was one of the factors that was
emphasized there. So, you are right, that does matter.
But the key point is that the inquiry is into whether what is going on
is an effort to avoid constitutional protections by circumventing criminal
procedure protections by calling something a tax which is really a
criminal penalty. The fact that it is called a tax does not matter and
underscores my point that labels have not been definitive here. In terms
of regulatory purpose as a whole, I think the Court has said in the Bob
Jones decision, any distinction we used to have between regulating and
regulatory taxes is cast aside. 80
In terms of direct apportionment, after you look at the case law about
what is a direct tax, this really does not fall into that box. Going back
to very early on, in 1796, in the Hylton decision,"' the Court read
direct tax quite narrowly as including only a capitation tax or a tax on
real property, and then expanded it in the Pollack case to include
personal property."' But it has never been read to apply to taxes
beyond that. This is not that kind of a tax. This is not a tax on people
because they exist; this is a tax on an event, the decision to forego
insurance. There are also many exemptions for people who do not have
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Dep't of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767 (1994).
Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 741 n.12 (1974).
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insurance, yet are not liable for the tax for a variety of reasons. As the
provision is neither a capitation tax nor a tax on property, I do not think
the apportionment requirement is an issue.
I want to respond briefly to the point that Professor Barnett made
about political constraints and the importance of policing Congress.
First, I think there is much more evidence in the record that Congress
intended to use the tax power here than the opponents and the district
courts have acknowledged. I love this use of the President's statements
to determine a congressional intent, but more importantly, there
certainly are also statements by members of Congress invoking the tax
power. The bigger issue here, however, is the jurisprudential one about
requiring it to invoke the basis on which it acts. Again, there are ways
of limiting Congress that involve objectively assessing whether or not
something falls within a power that do not involve this kind of second
guessing of a possible basis for valid enactment. The clear statement
requirements that courts have used in the past have been used to
narrow the scope of an enactment. They are not used to question
whether or not it comes under a particular basis. So, I think the effort
to use a clear statement requirement here would be a dramatic change
from how such requirements have been used in the past. It is something
that could be imposed; but, again, given the case law holding that labels
are not determinative and no requirement of a clear statement so far, it
would be a change in existing law.
PROFESSOR BARNETT: I want to move to category three constitutionality, whether there are five votes. I'm moving away from the others
on the tax power question, My view is that if there are five votes to
uphold this law, it will never be on a tax power theory. It will be under
a (unintelligible) theory. One reason I feel confident about that is they
have Erwin's theory they can use, so they don't have to go to the tax
power. And why would they not want to do that? For the first time in
American history, Congress would have the power to mandate or compel
and actually order Americans to do anything at all as long as it limits
the sanctions of a monetary fine that is collected by the IRS. It would
be essentially unlimited police power that would be subject to no constraints whatsoever. I can't imagine the Court willing to go down that
road if they have five votes. If they have a theory of a kind that Erwin
said, which I think has its own problems, and obviously I don't agree
with it, but given the availability of that, I can't believe they would do
that. If they were unpersuaded by Erwin's theory, I don't think they
will be persuaded by the tax power theory. I think it's a very good
reason why even the lower courts that turned away the challenge have
rejected a tax power theory. I just predict that's what will happen under
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category three, rightly or wrongly.
DEAN CHEMERINSKY: If there is any place where the Supreme
Court since 1937 has been very deferential to government at all levels,
it is when it comes to taxing and spending. Let me address the first
part of the question. If the tax is greater than what is necessary for
revenue, will it then be deemed a penalty? I think what the Court is
likely to say is, the line at which the tax generates more revenue than
is necessary and becomes a penalty is one in which there has got to be
great deference to Congress. How is the Court going to ever calculate
how much health care is going to cost in the United States? In United
States v. Butler,' which even precedes the change in the Court, the
Supreme Court says Congress can tax and spend so long as it believes
it serves the general welfare.
As to the second question, whether it is direct or indirect, I agree with
what Professor Metzger said. Imagine that Congress said the following:
"Everyone is going to need health care in their life. We want to make
sure that everybody has health insurance. Therefore, everybody must
pay a tax if we are going to subsidize the program, but if you purchase
your own health insurance, you can opt out of the tax." Wouldn't that be
constitutional? If that is constitutional, then isn't this, as Professor
Metzger says, just a choice of the labels to be used? I do not have a
prediction on whether the Court is going to uphold this under the
Commerce Clause or the taxing power. I think that in both instances
the precedents are clear that Congress can do this and it fits within the
scope of federal authority.
PROFESSOR BARNETT: I just want to say, and maybe we'll end on
a point of agreement here, that if Medicare is constitutional, then
Medicare for everyone is constitutional. I don't think there is any
question under existing doctrine, that if Medicare, a tax and spending
program, is constitutional, then putting everyone into a Medicare
program is constitutional. Perhaps extensions from that program could
be put into effect of the kind that Erwin described and as some people
favor, for example, Social Security. But Congress would have to do that.
Erwin calls these mere labels, but I don't think that they are mere
labels. I think the Constitution has certain rules, and Congress has to
follow the rules, and particularly when there are ways for Congress to
accomplish its purposes under the rules, they need to follow the rules for
doing so. Why? Precisely because of the political constraints Gillian is

183.
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talking about. And why didn't they? Because there were not the votes
to adopt a Medicare-for-everyone program. Most of my colleagues who
are health care regulation advocates wanted Medicare for everyone.
They wanted a single-payer plan, but there were not the votes for that,
so Congress decided to go this way. Instead of taxing the people, as
Medicare does, Congress decided to make people give their money
directly to insurance companies for the first time ever.
Let me just close on a thought experiment. If this had never been
done before, if the American people as a whole had never been mandated
to engage in economic activities under the Commerce Clause power, each
and every one of you in this room would be aware of that fact because
you would know about the economic mandates to which you must
conform your conduct. You all are witnesses to the fact that there are
federal mandates. You know you have to file a tax return and sign up
for Selective Service, and you know you might have to respond to a
census form. But other than that, you don't know of any economic
mandates on yourself or that have ever been imposed on your parents or
your grandparents. That's the sense in which I mean this is unprecedented. Can the Supreme Court uphold this for the first time ever?
Well, they've upheld expansions of power, and maybe there are five votes
to do so this time. But they would be doing something new and
different, and they would have to do so knowingly. I suspect that there
are not five votes to do this because the doctrine has never been
stretched this far. They are certainly not compelled to allow this the
way they would be by the doctrine, for example, that allows Congress to
regulate the insurance companies, which I remind you has not been
challenged by anyone in this litigation.
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